

Top Secret

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Friday 23 June 1978

CG NIDC 78/146C

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, 23 June 1978.

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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USSR-AFRICA: Intensified Policy

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[] Yesterday's harshly worded statement by the USSR on Africa makes it clear that Moscow has decided to intensify its efforts to arouse black African opinion against the US and Western Europe, focusing on what it perceives as African resentment of Western military and political responses to the Shaba invasion. Much of the statement attempts to alarm the Africans about the threat of a coordinated return of "former colonialists" to the continent "under false cover." The tone of the document is intended to hammer home the message that Moscow is the champion of African liberation, that the US is Africa's central enemy, and that detente must continue to be accommodated to Soviet determination to defend African "progressive" states and causes.

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[] The Soviet statement is evidently intended both to seize new opportunities and to counter what the Soviets sense may be new vulnerabilities. While seeking to exploit "progressive" African criticism of the Western response to the Zaire crisis--particularly from Tanzanian President Nyerere--the Soviets apparently are equally concerned with fighting off what they see as renewed US efforts to appeal to black African interests. They speak of "hypocritical talk by high-placed people"--an allusion to President Carter's comments at Annapolis about the US desire to see Africa free, and Secretary Vance's reiteration of this idea on Tuesday.

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[] These remarks apparently suggested to the Soviets that the US was moving to overcome the political handicaps for the West that resulted from support for Zaire's President Mobutu. Western economic support for Zambia and the appointment of a US emissary to Angola have undoubtedly added to recent Soviet concerns.

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[] At the same time, Moscow seeks to create a picture of the US leading a rapidly coalescing alliance of the other NATO powers, the South Africans, and the Chinese against African interests. China's support for the intervention in Zaire is cited as an example of Peking's sympathy with NATO's tactics on the continent.

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[redacted] Moscow is presumably still obsessed with its history of competition with China in various African countries, particularly in Tanzania and Mozambique, and used this opportunity to exploit Foreign Minister Huang Hua's recent discussion with Mobutu.

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[redacted] The statement indicates that Moscow will pursue the course it has been following in Africa for the past several years but does not appear to reflect any decision to assume more serious military risks on behalf of the Soviets' African clients.

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
CHINA-VIETNAM: Situation Report

[] *The evacuation of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam is being delayed by a disagreement over procedures. Chinese ships will apparently remain anchored off the Vietnamese coast pending resolution of the deadlock.*

[] Hanoi yesterday issued a press communique revealing that Vietnamese Foreign Ministry officials and representatives of the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi have been negotiating since Monday but have been unable to agree on specific evacuation procedures. The major dispute appears to be over which side will determine who is eligible to leave on the Chinese ships. The Chinese are also refusing to agree to Vietnamese stipulations that each ship spend no more than three days at a time in a Vietnamese port.

[] Chinese officials said yesterday that one of their passenger ships is anchored off Haiphong and another off Vung Tau east of Ho Chi Minh City, and that both would remain in place until the present "difficulties" are cleared up.

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[REDACTED] Vietnamese authorities in Ho Chi Minh City have announced that the deadline for ethnic Chinese to apply for exit visas expired yesterday.

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


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
[REDACTED] There continues to be no sign of unusual military activity by either side.

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EAST GERMANY: Relations with Bonn

[redacted] After several months of hesitation, East Germany has indicated in recent high-level talks with West German representatives that it is willing to proceed with a number of major projects with West Germany. This collaboration should yield some improvement in relations, but no major breakthroughs. The East Germans have shown a willingness to negotiate on projects that will bring in hard currency, but they remain adamant on issues of greater political significance. The new impetus in relations follows Soviet President Brezhnev's visit to Bonn and suggests that Moscow is continuing to promote better Eastern relations with West Germany, no matter what may be developing in the larger East-West arena.

25X1 [] The West German Foreign Office believes that some of the major projects, like the construction of a Hamburg - West Berlin autobahn and the reopening of the Teltow Canal, can now be successfully negotiated. A smaller project involving extension of a border crossing point also appears likely.

25X1 [] East Germany further indicated its rekindled interest in inner-German matters this week when it changed a meeting with West German Permanent Representative Gaus from the Ministry of Transport to the Foreign Ministry. Gaus said the shift reflected the importance of the topics being discussed.

25X1 [] Moreover, Gaus described East German party chief Honecker as having been surprisingly forthcoming during a meeting last week between the two men--an attitude the West Germans consider to be a result of Brezhnev's visit to West Germany. Honecker himself had requested the session, his first with Gaus since 1976.

25X1 [] The Soviets indicated support for the more forthcoming East German position during talks between West Berlin governing mayor Stobbe and the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany on 2 June. The Ambassador predicted that problems concerning the autobahn and canal could be resolved.

25X1 [] East Germany's willingness to proceed in negotiations with the Federal Republic is in part due to its serious need to obtain hard currency, which the autobahn and canal projects will bring in. This is an objective that the Soviets support, but Moscow will also seek to stiffen East Germany's reluctance to compromise on political matters.

25X1 [] In this connection, Honecker gave no indication to Gaus of concessions on humanitarian issues, reiterated his demand for Bonn's outright recognition of separate East German citizenship and nationality, and noted that an agreement on the disputed Elbe River border was not in sight--although he said concurrence was possible on the rest of the border. No plans were made for a meeting between Honecker and Chancellor Schmidt, although both sides claim to look forward to such a meeting eventually. []

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